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Abstract
We develop a general equilibrium model of technological change and migration to examine
the eects of a change in skill endowments on wages, employment rates and emigration rates of
skilled and unskilled workers. We nd that, depending on the elasticity of substitution between
skilled and unskilled workers, an increase in the skill ratio can increase the expected wage of
the skilled and decrease the brain drain. We provide empirical estimates and simulations to
support our ndings and show that eects are empirically relevant and potentially sizeable.
Our ndings t the stylized facts on educational upgrading in developing countries during the
1980s and the subsequent decrease in the brain drain from those countries during the 1990s.
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11 Introduction
Around the world, large numbers of migrants are moving from their home countries to foreign
countries to improve their labor market situation. In the developing world, labor markets are very
often characterized by low wages and high unemployment rates relative to developed countries,
which makes emigration an attractive option. This seems to be true in particular for highly skilled
workers: between 1990 and 2000, the stock of high-skilled immigrants in OECD countries (most of
whom came from developing countries) increased by 70%, while the stock of unskilled immigrants
increased by only 30%.1 This emigration of the highly skilled { the so-called brain drain { is of
growing concern to emigration countries due to its potentially very detrimental eects on public
nances, productivity and growth.
The commonly cited reasons for migration incentives to be stronger for the skilled than for the
unskilled are higher expected gains in wages or lower migration costs of the skilled. A third factor,
which has been rather neglected in the relevant literature so far, is employment prospects for the
skilled. Indeed, while indicators for OECD countries typically show that higher levels of education
are associated with higher labor market participation and employment rates, similar indicators for
non-OECD countries seem to contradict this nding. The (few) existing studies on skill-specic
unemployment rates in developing countries nd that a higher level of educational attainment may
not reduce the risk of unemployment in those countries but may even increase it. Michaelowa and
Waller (2003), for example, nd the unemployment rate in Indonesia to be highest among the most
highly educated. In countries like Morocco and Tunisia unemployment rates among college degree
holders can be several multiples of those among the poorly educated.2
In this paper, we show that there is a systematic relationship between skill endowments and skill-
specic labor market outcomes { both across countries and over time { which aects skill-specic
emigration rates and the brain drain. As an illustration, Figure 1 plots relative unemployment rates
of skilled relative to unskilled workers for a panel of both OECD and non-OECD countries against
relative skill endowments.3 It is apparent that countries with a higher skill ratio have a substantially
lower unemployment rate of skilled relative to unskilled workers. Moreover, the observed links
between the skill ratio and skill-specic labor market outcomes aect the relationship between
the skill ratio and emigration rates of the skilled and unskilled accordingly: more skill-abundant
countries have a signicantly lower migration rate of skilled relative to unskilled workers, henceforth
denoted as brain drain. Figure 2 provides a (partial) correlation plot between the brain drain and
1Docquier and Marfouk (2006).
2The Economist, 26 May 2011.
3Skilled workers are dened as workers with at least some tertiary education in the population over 25 years.
Unemployment rates by skill are constructed from the ILO Key Indicators of the Labor Market (see the Appendix
for a description), data on educational attainment are from Barro and Lee (2000). All (partial) correlation plots
control for time dummies.
2countries' skill ratios.4 Clearly, more skill abundant countries suer much less from brain drain
than skill scarce ones. Finally, Figure 3 correlates the brain drain with the relative unemployment
rate of skilled workers { countries with relative lower unemployment rates of skilled have lower
relative migration rates of skilled workers. Overall, these observations indicate that demand for
skill is far higher in skill abundant countries, leading to relatively better labor market outcomes of
skilled workers.
The time-series evidence points in a similar direction. Educational attainment has increased sharply
in many countries in particular in the developing world. This is true for all levels of education and
most notably for tertiary education: the share of the population aged 25 and over who have attained
tertiary education increased by 36% (from 3.6 to 4.9) in developing countries during 1990 and 20005
(Barro and Lee (2000)).6 Figure 4 provides a scatter plot of skill ratios in OECD (panel a) and
non-OECD (panel b) countries in 1990 and 2000. The gure shows that the skill ratio increased
in most OECD countries and in all non-OECD countries between 1990 and 2000, very remarkably
so for example in Korea, Peru, the Philippines or the Russian Federation. At the same time, the
emigration rate of the skilled in developing countries actually decreased both in absolute terms
(from 7.8% in 1990 to 7.4% in 2000)7 and as a ratio of the average emigration rate (from 7 to 5)8
(Docquier and Marfouk (2006)). Figure 5 conrms the negative (partial) correlation between the
changes in skill ratios and in the brain drain during 1990 and 2000.
In this paper we rst present more formal empirical evidence showing that the observed relations
hold true when allowing for a time lag between changes in the skill ratio and in the brain drain,
using additional controls and addressing causality. We then set up a model that allows us to analyze
the general equilibrium eects of changes in the skill composition of workers on skill-specic labor
market outcomes and emigration rates. Our model encompasses two important features: directed
technological change and frictional unemployment. As we allow for production technologies { and
thus relative demand for skill { to adjust endogenously to changes in skill endowments, returns to
skill can be increasing in the relative supply of skilled workers for empirically plausible parameter
values. As we allow for unemployment, a change in the supply of skills can translate into both a
change in wages and in unemployment rates.
We rst determine conditions for an increase in the skill ratio to increase skill-specic wages and
employment rates in partial equilibrium (i.e. for given emigration rates of the skilled and unskilled)
4Data on migration by skill to the OECD are from Beine, Docquier and Rapoport (2008).
5It increased by 18%, from 7.7 to 9.1, worldwide.
6For regular reports on the education performance of countries in a cross-section and over time see, for example,
the OECD's Education at a Glance (OECD countries) and the UNESCO's Education Trends in Perspective (non-
OECD countries).
7It remained roughly constant at around 5% worldwide.
8It remained roughly constant at 3 worldwide.
3depending on the size of two parameters: the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled
workers and the elasticity of the job matching function. We nd that for plausible parameter values,
labor market conditions of the skilled can actually improve with an increase in the skill ratio. This
is because rst, if technology is directed and the elasticity of substitution between skilled and
unskilled is large enough, relative factor abundance increases relative factor productivity and,
therefore, relative factor demand: the relative labor demand curve is upward-sloping. And second,
if the elasticity of the matching function is large enough, the labor market is suciently exible to
accommodate an increase in the number of skilled with an increase in the employment rate (and
wage) of the skilled.
We then proceed to determine the eects of an increase in the skill ratio in general equilibrium,
where we take into account that skill-specic emigration rates will change endogenously in response
to changes in wages and unemployment rates. We calibrate our model to show that it can replicate
both the cross-sectional correlations mentioned above (negative correlation between skill ratios
and relative unemployment of skilled, negative correlation between skill ratio and brain drain and
positive correlation between relative unemployment rate of skilled and brain drain), as well as the
negative correlation between education upgrading and the drop in brain drain that occurred during
the 1990's. Finally, we also show that at the levels of skill ratios that are currently prevailing in
many developing countries, increases in the skill ratio can potentially result in sizeable decreases
in the brain drain.
The existing literature on brain drain shows that increases in the skill ratio can coincide with
decreases in the brain drain. On the one hand, this is because workers may invest more in education
when their emigration probability increases. If the net eect on the domestic skill ratio is positive {
i.e., if relatively few of the workers that obtain higher education because of the migration perspective
emigrate { then higher skilled emigration prospects can reduce the brain drain.9 According to this
strand of the literature an increase in the migration probability can cause an increase in human
capital in the source country. On the other hand, as has been observed more recently, an increase in
human capital in the source country can increase domestic wages and, therefore, reduce emigration
incentives, if returns to skilled labor are increasing. This is the case in De la Croix and Docquier
(2010) and Grossmann and Stadelmann (2011), where productivity is assumed to be increasing in
skilled labor endowments.
In this paper, we examine the latter channel and analyze causality running from skill ratios to
migration rates. We contribute to the literature in several ways. First, we explicitly model skill-
biased technological change (Acemoglu (1998), (2002), Gancia and Zilibotti (2008)) to examine in
more detail the eects of the skill ratio on skill-specic labor market conditions and, in consequence,
9Then, the brain drain corresponds in fact to a so-called brain gain. See for example Mountford (1997), Stark,
Helmenstein and Prszkawetz (1997, 1998), Beine, Docquier and Rapoport (2001, 2008).
4the brain drain. Second, in contrast to the existing literature, we do not look exclusively at wages
as determinants of the brain drain but also at unemployment rates: while wages are denitely
an important determinant of the decision of workers to emigrate, their employment probability
is likely to be at least as important.10 We therefore assume that there are frictions in the labor
market according to the theory of job search and matching (Mortensen (1970), Diamond (1981),
Pissarides (1990/2000)) and thereby integrate the literature on frictional unemployment with the
one on directed technological change. As a result, we can show how the supply of skills aects
not only relative wages, but also relative employment rates of skilled and unskilled workers in the
presence of directed technological change. In fact, we nd that if labor demand elasticities are
high, directed technological change may manifest itself not so much in the form of increasing skill
premia but, rather, in increasing employment opportunities for the skilled. Finally, we contribute
to the literature by providing empirical evidence for the link from skill upgrading to skill-biased
technological change, unemployment and migration.
In terms of policy implications, our ndings suggest that educational policies that serve to improve
the skills of the workforce may be even more important than commonly acknowledged. Countries
that face a deterioration in their skilled workforce through emigration might be able to turn around
emigration trends by increasing their skill share and thereby improving demand for skilled labor
and thus labor market conditions for the skilled at home. If unmet by an adequate policy response,
however, emigration of the skilled workforce might develop a self-enforcing momentum, as labor
market conditions for the skilled deteriorate further and emigration incentives are reinforced.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we provide empirical evidence for the links between
skill ratios, skill premia, unemployment rates, technologies and emigration rates of the skilled and
unskilled across countries and over time during the period 1980-2000. In section 3, we set up a model
of skill-biased technological change and unemployment. We rst derive the partial equilibrium
without migration, both for the case where technology is exogenous and where it is endogenous.
We then formulate the general equilibrium with migration. Section 4 presents numerical simulations
that document the quantitative importance of eects resulting from changes in skill endowments. It
also shows that the correlations between skill endowments, labor market outcomes and migration
as predicted by our model t the actual correlations as observed in the data pretty well. Section 5
concludes.
10In fact, we nd that wage dierences are no longer signicant once we control for unemployment rates.
52 Empirical evidence
In this section we provide empirical evidence on the relation between skill ratios and skill-specic
migration rates, unemployment and wages. We rst investigate the eect of skill ratios on emigra-
tion rates and the brain drain and then turn more specically to the channels through which skill
ratios can possibly aect migration decisions, by looking at the eect on wages and unemployment
rates. The picture that emerges is consistent and robust over a large variation of specications:
an increase in the (lagged) skill ratio decreases emigration of the skilled, increases emigration of
the unskilled and decreases the brain drain (dened as the migration rate of skilled relative to
unskilled as described below). Further, an increase in the (lagged) skill ratio decreases relative
unemployment of the skilled and thus potentially increases expected relative wages of the skilled,
even though it is found to slightly decrease the skill premium. Moreover, we show that an increase
in the skill ratio increases the relative productivity of skilled workers. Finally, we provide evidence
on the eects of labor market outcomes on the brain drain: the brain drain increases in relative
unemployment of the skilled, while there is no robust eect of wages.
Data on emigration to the OECD by skill level are from Beine, Docquier and Rapoport (2008). Data
on human capital come from Barro and Lee (2000) and De La Fuente and Domenech (2002). Data
on wages by skill category are constructed using the dataset collected by Freeman and Oostendorp
(2000) and information on unemployment rates by skill are constructed from the ILO Key Indicators
of the Labour Market Database (2009). Migration data are available for 1990 and 2000, while for
the other data we have an unbalanced panel in ve-year intervals from 1980 to 2000. A more
detailed discussion of the dataset can be found in the Appendix.
2.1 Skill Ratio, Migration Rates and Brain Drain
We rst investigate the relation between the skill ratio and migration rates of skilled and unskilled
workers. We derive our estimating model from the following simple partial equilibrium model of
migration: Let the utility for individual k of skill type j associated with migration to the OECD
be given by
UM
j (k) = wOECD
j xOECD
j   cj   "(k); j 2 H;L
and let utility associated with staying in the country of origin be given by
US
j = wjxj; j 2 H;L
where j 2 fH;Lg, wj is the skill-specic (absolute) wage, xj is the skill-specic probability of em-
ployment (one minus the unemployment rate), cj is the deterministic skill-specic cost of migration
6to the OECD in terms of utility and "(k) is a stochastic migration cost that is individual-specic.
Then, the probability of emigration for a skilled (unskilled) worker can be written as the probability
that the stochastic migration cost is suciently low so that the expected wage in the OECD
adjusted for the deterministic part of migration costs is larger than the expected wage in the
country of origin:
Prob(UM
j (k) > US
j ) = Prob(" < wOECD
j xOECD
j   wjxj   cj); j 2 H;L
Assuming that migration costs are logistically distributed with mean zero and variance unity, the
migration rate for skill type j is:
sj = Prob(UM






j  wjxj cj); j 2 H;L (1)
Thus, log(sj=(1   sj)) = wOECD
j xOECD
j   wjxj   cj. We proxy for expected wages as being a
function of the skill ratio, specifying wjxj =  log(H=L) and we model the deterministic migration
cost as cj = log(X) to obtain the following regression specication:
log(sj=(1   sj))it =  +  log(H=L)it +  log(X)it + t + ui + it; (2)
where sjit is the migration rate of skill group j 2 fH;Lg in country i in period t 2 f1990;2000g, Xit
is a vector of country controls, t is a time dummy and ui is an unobserved country-specic eect.
The vector of country control variables includes, depending on the specication, rst, the growth
rate of real GDP in purchasing power parities (PPP) and the level of real GDP per capita in PPPs
to control for the economic incentives to migrate that are related to country income.11 Second,
it includes openness12 because openness may aect the relative demand for skilled workers (e.g.
through a skill-biased scale eect, see Epifani and Gancia (2008)). Third, it includes a number of
controls that proxy for geographic motives for migration, such as distance to the OECD, a dummy
for having been a colony of an OECD country after 1945 and dummies for English and French as
ocial languages.
In columns (1) to (3) of Table 1 we pool observations for 1990 and 2000 and regress (the logistic
transformation of) skilled migration rates on the log skill ratio, country controls and time dummies.
In all specications the coecient of the skill ratio is negative and strongly signicant.13 Thus,
countries with higher skill ratios have lower skilled migration rates, which according to our model is
11In particular, GDP per capita is a proxy for the wage in the country of origin. As emphasized by Rosenzweig
(2010) and Grogger and Hanson (2011), absolute wage dierentials are an important motive for migration.
12Dened as (exports+imports)/GDP.
13Throughout the paper all standard errors are clustered at the country level.
7due to the fact that expected wages for the skilled must be higher in those countries. The coecient
of the skill ratio remains negative and (marginally) signicant in column (4), where we instrument
for the skill ratio using a ten-year lag of public expenditure on education as a fraction of GDP to
address the potential endogeneity of the skill ratio with respect to the migration rate.14 Again, the
coecient of skill ratio stays negative and signicant.15 In columns (5) to (7) we estimate equation
(1) in dierences to control for unobserved heterogeneity at the country level and to better address
causality. In columns (5) and (6) we use lagged dierences in the log skill ratio as an explanatory
variable to address potential reverse causality.16 The coecient of the skill ratio remains negative
and (marginally) signicant. Finally, in column (7) we use contemporaneous changes in the skill
ratio as our explanatory variable and instrument it using changes in education expenditure lagged
by ten years. Again, we nd a negative and signicant eect of the skill ratio on skilled migration.17
In columns (8) to (14) of Table 1 we repeat the same specications for unskilled migration rates.
In columns (8) to (10) we obtain a positive and signicant coecient on log skill ratio, but the
coecient becomes insignicant once we instrument for the skill ratio in column (11) using lagged
education expenditure and in the specications in dierences that take care of unobserved country-
specic heterogeneity (columns (12)-(14)). In sum, we nd that an increase in the skill ratio de-
creases skilled migration rates and possibly increases unskilled migration rates.
We now turn to the relation between skill ratios and relative migration rates sH=sL (brain





L )   (wHxH   wLxL)   (cH   cL). We thus employ the following
empirical specication:
log(sH=sL)it =  +  log(H=L)it +  log(X)it + t + ui + it; (3)
where  log(H=L)it proxies for the part of dierences in expected wages (wHxH   wLxL) that
depends on the skill ratio and  log(X)it proxies for dierences in migration costs (cH   cL) and
for other determinants of dierences in expected wages. In columns (1) to (3) of Table 2 we regress
log brain drain on log skill ratio, country controls and time dummies, pooling observations for
1990 and 2000. The coecient of log skill ratio is negative and signicant at the one percent level.
In terms of magnitudes, a one percent increase in the skill ratio implies a 0.63 to 0.83 percent
14As discussed in the introduction, the skill ratio should be endogenous to the migration rate according to the
literature on brain gain.
15In the unreported rst stage regression, the instrument is signicant at the one percent level.
16Since migration rates are dened as stocks of migrants relative to stocks of residents plus migrants, current
changes in migration rates may be mechanically related to changes in skill ratios, if migration occurs with a lag.
Using ten-year lags of changes in skill ratios as an explanatory variable should take care of this problem, provided
that someone who acquired his tertiary education in the 1980's emigrated until the end of the 1990's.
17In the unreported rst stage regression the instrument is signicant at the ve percent level.
8drop in the brain drain. In column (4) we instrument log skill ratio with a ten-year lag in public
education expenditure. In the rst stage, the instrument is signicant at the one percent level and
the coecient of skill ratio, which continues to be signicant at the one percent level, increases in
absolute magnitude to -0.97. In columns (5) to (7) we specify the regression in dierences, which
takes care of the unobserved country-specic eects that may aect relative migration rates. In
columns (5) and (6) we use a ten-year lag in the log change of the skill ratio as the explanatory
variable to avoid issues of reverse causality and in column (7) we alternatively instrument contem-
poraneous log changes in skill ratios with lagged changes in education expenditure. This instrument
is signicant at the ve percent level. In all cases the coecient of skill ratio remains negative and
signicant but is reduced in magnitude { a one percent increase in the skill ratio is now associated
with a 0.23 to 0.46 percent drop in the brain drain.
Overall, we conclude that there is robust evidence for an increase in the skill ratio to cause a
signicant reduction in the brain drain, which seems to be driven mainly by a reduction in the
migration rate of the skilled.
2.2 Skill Ratio and Unemployment
Our model of migration suggests that the eect of the skill ratio on brain drain is driven by a
change in expected wages, which are partially determined by dierences in (un)employment rates.
Therefore, we now investigate more carefully whether the negative correlation between the skill
ratio and the relative unemployment rate of skilled that we have described in the introduction is
robust to controlling for additional variables and potential reverse causality.
We use the following econometric specication
log(uH)it   log(uL)it =  +  log(H=L)it +  log(X)it + t + ui + it; (4)
where log(uH)it log(uL)it is the (log) relative unemployment rate of skilled in country i in period
t, log(X)it is again a vector of country controls, that includes { depending on the specication
{ the real growth rate of GDP, the level of GDP per capita and openness, t is a time dummy
and ui is an unobserved country-specic eect. In this regression, we use an unbalanced panel
in ve year intervals from 1980-2000. In columns (1)-(3) of Table 3 we regress the level of the
relative unemployment rate on the log skill ratio. The coecient of the skill ratio is negative and
strongly signicant in columns (1) and (2) and marginally insignicant in column (3). In terms
of magnitude, a one percent increase in the skill ratio is associated with a roughly 0.4 percent
reduction in the relative unemployment rate of the skilled. To address potential endogeneity of the
skill ratio with respect to unemployment, we instrument this variable using (log) public expenditure
9on education as a fraction of GDP in column (4). Again the coecient of the skill ratio is negative,
signicant at the one percent level and it increases in magnitude: a one percent increase in the skill
ratio is now associated with a 0.8 percent reduction in the relative unemployment rate. Finally,
in columns (5) and (6) we run specication (4) in dierences, which exploits the time variation
of the data and allows to control for unobserved country-specic eects. As our panel is strongly
unbalanced, we unfortunately lose many observations with this specication, so that the sample
size is reduced to 23 observations. In column (5) we use lagged changes in the skill ratio as our
main explanatory variable. The coecient of this variable is negative, strongly signicant and even
larger than the one from the cross-section regression { a one percent increase in the skill ratio now
implies a 3 percent drop in the relative unemployment rate of the skilled. Finally, in column (6) we
use contemporaneous changes in the skill ratio as the explanatory variable and instrument using
lagged changes in the same variable. The coecient of the skill ratio remains negative and strongly
signicant but now has an implausibly large magnitude (-22.67), which may be due to the small
number of observations (23) in that specication. This robust negative eect of the skill ratio on
the relative unemployment rate of skilled contradicts the common intuition that in countries where
skilled labor is relatively scarce unemployment rates of skilled workers should be relatively low.
2.3 Skill Ratio and Wages
The second channel through which the skill ratio may aect expected wages is via its eect on
skilled and unskilled wages. We thus run the following regression:
log(wH)it   log(wL)it =  +  log(H=L)it +  log(X)it + t + ui + it; (5)
where log(wH)it log(wL)it is the (log) relative wage of the skilled in country i in period t, log(X)it
is again a vector of country controls, that includes the real growth rate of GDP, the level of real
GDP per capita, and openness, t is a time dummy and ui is an unobserved country-specic eect.
Again, we use an unbalanced panel in ve-year intervals from 1980 to 2000.
Results are presented in columns (7)-(13) of Table 3. Columns (7) to (9) present results from the
pooled cross-section regression, controlling for time dummies. The coecient for the skill ratio is
-0.2 and strongly signicant. Thus, in the cross section a one percent higher skill ratio is associated
with a 0.2 percent lower skill premium. However, when adding GDP per capita as a control in
column (9) the coecient of skill ratio becomes insignicant. In column (10) we instrument the
skill ratio with 10-year lagged values of the same variable and still nd a signicant negative eect
of the skill ratio on the skill premium. However, results change when controlling for unobserved
country-specic eects in columns (11)-(13), where we run specication (5) in dierences. In column
10(11) we regress current changes in (log) wage premia on current changes in (log) skill ratios,
while in column (12) we instead employ 5-year lagged changes in skill ratios and in column (13)
we instrument current changes in skill ratios with 5-year lagged values of the same variable. In
all specications the coecient of the skill ratio is insignicantly dierent from zero. We thus
conclude that while there is some negative relation between relative wages and skill premia in the
cross-section, no such relation exists when controlling for GDP per capita or when exploiting the
time variation within countries. The nding that an accumulation of skilled workers does not lead
to a drop in the relative price of skilled workers suggests that the relative demand for skill increases
with relative supply. In fact, even the negative eect of -0.2 that we estimated in the cross section
would be too small and thus inconsistent with a story of exogenous relative demand for skills.









where HE and LE is the number of employed skilled and unskilled workers, AH, AL are the
productivities of skilled and unskilled workers, Z is a parameter and  is the elasticity of substitution
between skilled and unskilled workers. Under perfect competition, the rst-order conditions for
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. The estimate of    1= of  0:2, however, implies an elasticity of
substitution between skilled and unskilled workers equal to 5, which is far larger than the respective
consensus estimates, which range from 1.4 to around 2.5. (see, e.g. Ciccone and Peri (2006), Gancia
et al. (2011)). The fact that the relation between wage premia and skill ratios that is found in the
data is much weaker than expected is also observed in Caselli and Coleman (2006). As prominently
argued in their paper, a ratio of skill-specic technologies AH=AL that is higher in more skill
abundant countries would serve to reconcile expected and observed relations.
In sum, our empirical ndings as described in sections (2.2) and (2.3) suggest that greater skill ratios
result in greater expected wage premia and that, therefore, relative demand for skills increases with
relative supply { for example, because skill-specic technologies are endogenous. Over time, the
country-specic accumulation of skill seems to increase expected relative wages of skilled workers
because it reduces the relative unemployment rates of the skilled while not aecting their relative
wages. In the cross-section, while wage premia are somewhat larger in skill-scarce compared to skill-
18Skill-specic unemployment rates and wage data are jointly available only for a very limited number of countries.
11abundant countries, the skill-scarce countries exhibit signicantly greater unemployment rates for
skilled workers. Overall, this suggests that migration incentives for the skilled may be weaker, if
skill ratios are greater both across countries and over time. Indeed, this is what we nd when
looking at the eect of skill ratios on skill-specic emigration rates and brain drain, as described
in section (2.1) above.
2.4 Skill Ratio and Technology
We can take equation (7) a bit further and use it to back out the implied relative productivity of
skill AH=AL given an estimate of . Following Gancia et al. (2011), we set  = 2:25, which is close
to the upper end of existing estimates for this parameter and thus minimizes the chance that we
nd a (positive) relation between the relative productivity of skill and the skill ratio, as it implies
a relative demand curve that is rather at. In Table 4 we present results from regressing the so
obtained relative productivities on skill ratios, using the specication
log(AH=AL)it =  +  log(H=L)it +  log(X)it + t + ui + it: (8)
In columns (1)-(3) of Table 4 we regress relative productivity in logs on log skill ratios. We nd
that the coecient of the skill ratio is positive and strongly signicant. A one percent increase in
the skill ratio is associated with a 0.4 percent increase in the relative productivity of the skilled.
This holds true even when controlling for GDP growth and openness in columns (2)-(4), control-
ling additionally for per capita GDP in column (3) and instrumenting the skill ratio with public
education expenditure in column (4). When taking time dierences of equation (8) in columns (5)
and (6), the coecient of the skill ratio remains signicant and even increases in magnitude to
0.7 in column (5). When instrumenting changes in the skill ratio with lagged changes in the same
variable, the coecient remains unaected but the estimate is less precise so that the coecient
becomes insignicantly dierent from zero. We conclude that { provided the specication of the
aggregate production technology is correct { there is evidence for the relative productivity of skilled
workers to respond endogenously to the skill ratio.
2.5 Unemployment, Wages and Brain Drain
To complete our empirical investigation, we estimate the eect of unemployment and wages on the
brain drain. In columns (1)-(4) of Table 5 we regress log brain drain on the log relative unemploy-
ment rate of skilled workers according to the following specication:
log(sH=sL)it = 0 + 1 log(uH=uL)it + 2Xit + t + i + uit (9)
12As expected, the coecient for the relative unemployment rates is positive and signicant in spec-
ications (1) to (3). In the specication in column (1), where we only control for time dummies,
a one percent increase in relative unemployment rates is associated with a 0.5 percent increase in
the brain drain. In columns (2) and (3) we add the growth rate of GDP, openness and the level of
GDP per capita as further controls and still obtain a signicant positive eect of relative unem-
ployment rates on brain drain. When adding also bilateral controls in column (4), the coecient
of relative unemployment remains positive but becomes insignicant. In column (5) we instrument
relative unemployment rates with public expenditure on education, again obtaining a signicant
positive eect of relative unemployment on brain drain. In column (6), we estimate the regression
in dierences to account for unobserved heterogeneity, using changes in unemployment as our main
explanatory variable. We still get a positive and signicant eect of relative unemployment rates
on brain drain, even though in this case we have only 13 observations.
In unreported regressions we do not nd any signicant relation between skill premia and the
brain drain once controlling for income per worker or unobserved country-specic eects. Follow-
ing Rosenzweig (2010) and Grogger and Hanson (2011), who emphasize that absolute (and not
relative) wage dierences between the origin and the destination country are relevant for migration
incentives, we also used the absolute dierence in wages as an explanatory variable. However, while
dierences in unemployment rates always have a positive and very signicant eect on the brain
drain, absolute wage dierences have a signicant eect only as long as dierences in unemployment
rates are not included.19
To conclude, our empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that an increase in the supply of skills
leads { via skill-biased technological change { to an increase in the demand for skills, which in
turn reduces the relative unemployment rate of skilled workers and attenuates their incentives to
emigrate. The following model of skill-biased technological change provides a structure for the links
between skill endowments and brain drain as observed above.
3 The Model
3.1 Production
We use a model with two dierent types of labor, skilled and unskilled workers, and factor-biased
(directed) technical progress based on Acemoglu (1998, 2002) and Gancia and Zilibotti (2008).20
Final output can be used for consumption, investment and to pay for the hiring costs of workers
19The results are available on request.
20While our model is static for reasons of tractability, the comparative statics of skill endowment eects on
technology are the same as the steady-state ones in a dynamic model such as Acemoglu (1998, 2002).
13in the intermediate sector. The nal output sector is perfectly competitive and nal output is













where YL and YH are sectoral aggregate goods produced with unskilled labor L and skilled labor
H, respectively, and  > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between them. From the nal producers'
































L = 1 (14)
Sectoral nal output is produced under perfect competition using a constant elasticity of substitu-
tion aggregator over a measure AL (AH) of sector-specic dierentiated intermediate inputs, yL(i)


















The range of available intermediates captures the state of technology and will be endogenously
determined in equilibrium. The terms EL  A
 2
 1
L and EH  A
 2
 1
H are externalities that conve-
niently pin down a degree of increasing returns that makes sectoral production functions linear
in AL(AH) and simplify the algebra. Note that this normalization does not change any of the
qualitative implications of the model (compare Gancia and Zilibotti (2008)).
From the sectoral nal producers' prot maximization problem, we obtain the inverse demand
functions for intermediate goods









14Producers in the intermediate sectors are monopolistically competitive and use skilled (unskilled)
labor in production. Their production technology is given by yL(i) = l(i) and yH(i) = Zh(i).
Using the demand functions for intermediates (16) it follows that revenue of intermediate producers












Firms in the intermediate sectors face labor market frictions. A rm in the L (H) sector that wants
to hire l (h) workers must pay a hiring cost of bLl (bHh), where bj, j 2 fH;Lg, is exogenous to the
rm but depends on labor market frictions to be discussed below. As a consequence, workers cannot
be replaced without a cost and this makes workers inside the rm dierent from workers outside
the rm. In particular, workers have bargaining power once they have been hired. We assume
strategic wage bargaining with equal weights between the h (l) workers and the rm  a la Stole
and Zwiebel (1996a,b). This leads to a distribution of revenue according to Shapley values. The
revenue function (17) implies that the rm gets a fraction =(2   1) of the revenue and workers
get a fraction ( 1)=(2 1). Then, the rm chooses an employment level that maximizes prots,

















 PHEH   bHh(i)   H:
(18)
where L(H) is the xed cost of producing a variety of intermediates in sector L(H) in terms of
the nal good.
The solution to this prot maximization problem implies that the optimal employment of rms
equals



















Using this together with demand (16) and production technologies yL = l, yH = Zh, we nd that
optimal prices are given by constant markups over the hiring costs:













Since wages equal a fraction (   1)=(2   1) of revenue (17) divided by employment (19), we
obtain:
wj = bj; j 2 fL;Hg (21)





pLyL   L H =
1
2   1
pHyH   H (22)
3.2 Labor Market
Each country is populated by two types of individuals that are in xed supply. There are H skilled
workers and L unskilled workers who maximize expected utility from consumption, Uj = E(Cj),
where j 2 fH;Lg, given their expected income. Let HE(LE) be the aggregate employment of
skilled (unskilled) workers. A skilled (unskilled) individual that searches for work nds a job with
probability xH = HE=H (xL = LE=L), where xj measures the degree of labor market tightness in
sector j. Thus, her expected income equals xHwH if she is skilled (xLwL if she is unskilled).
As in the standard model of job search and unemployment (e.g. Diamond (1981), Mortensen (1970),
Pissarides (1990/2000)), we assume that rms have to post vacancies in order to attract workers.
This implies that the cost of hiring, bj, depends on labor market tightness. Following Helpman and
Itskhoki (2007) and Blanchard and Gali (2008), we assume that
bj = ajx
j ; j 2 (L;H) aj > 1 and  > 0; (23)
where bj is the cost of hiring per worker, xj is the employment rate measuring the degree of sectoral
labor market tightness, aj is a measure of frictions in the labor market21 and  is the elasticity of
the wage with respect to the employment rate x. Using (21) together with (23), we obtain a rst














For given relative employment levels HE and LE the relative wage of skilled workers is decreasing
in relative endowments of skilled workers.
3.3 Exogenous Technology
We now solve for the equilibrium of the economy, assuming for the moment that the level of
technology, AH;AL, is exogenously given and that there is no possibility to migrate.
21Higher values of aj correspond to greater frictions in the labor market.









we get l(i) = LE
AL and h(i) = HE
AH . Substituting these in sectoral production functions (15), we can
express sectoral output as
YL = ALLE and YH = AHZHE (25)










Now, we can derive a second expression for the skill premium { for given levels of technology
AH;AL { by using (20), (21) and (25), observing that the revenue of the intermediate sectors
equals expenditure on sectoral intermediates, pLLE = PLYL and pHZHE = PHYH, and then

















Thus, the skill premium is increasing in the relative productivity of the skilled and decreasing in
the relative employment level of skilled workers.
In a situation where technology is exogenous, relative employment unambiguously increases in
relative labor supply, but relative wages and employment rates decrease. To see this, use (24)

















































Proposition 1. Assume technologies AH, AL are given. Then, an increase in the relative number
of skilled individuals always results in a decrease in their wage and employment rate relative to
the unskilled.
Figure 6 provides an illustration of the labor market equilibrium with exogenous technology. As the
relative supply of skilled, H=L, increases, the relative matching function (24) shifts to the right {
rms nd it easier to employ relatively more skilled workers at given wages (=hiring costs) because
the relative labor market tightness decreases. In turn, an increase in skilled employment requires a
decrease in skilled relative wages according to the relative labor demand function (27). In the new
equilibrium, relatively more skilled are employed than before, but both their (relative) wage and
employment rate are now lower.
3.4 Equilibrium with Migration and Exogenous Technology
We now allow for endogenous migration decisions. We assume that workers decide about emigration
in order to maximize utility: they will emigrate, if their expected utility abroad is greater than
at home, and stay at home otherwise.22 For given wages and employment rates in the OECD,
wOECD
j , xOECD
j (determined outside the model), skill-specic emigration rates sH and sL are











Note that expected wages wHxH and wLxL can be written as functions of sH and sL as follows.















The fact that expenditure on intermediates in sector H equals revenues of intermediate producers
in the same sector, implies that pH = PHYH
ZHE . Using this together with the expression for sectoral
output YH = AHZHE, it follows that pH = PHAH and similarly pL = PLAL. Using the optimal
22There is strong empirical support for income maximization as a rationale for migration, see for example Beine,
Docquier and Rapoport (2008), Grogger and Hanson (2008) or Rosenzweig (2010) for recent evidence.








and, analogously, for PL. We can
further substitute for the sectoral relative price PH=PL using (26) and for relative employment
using (28).
As a result, we can re-write wages wH and wL and employment rates xH and xL (which can be
expressed as functions of wages using (23) together with (21)) to derive expected wages as functions



































































Thus (31) and (32) are two nonlinear equations in sH and sL that have to be solved numerically
(in section 4 below). Note that the system has a unique solution. To see this, suppose the migration
rate of skilled workers is above the equilibrium value. Since an increase in the migration rate sH,
reduces the denominator of (35), expected wages of skilled workers are above their equilibrium value
and this reduces their migration rate towards the equilibrium value. The same intuition holds for
unskilled migration rates.
3.5 Endogenous Technology
We now allow for free entry in the intermediate sectors to pin down the state of technology AH;AL
endogenously. To gain intuition, we again solve rst for the equilibrium without migration.
Using optimal prots (22) and assuming that L = H = , free entry implies that intermediate




pLl    = 0 H =

2   1
pHh    = 0 (37)
Further, using the fact that pLLE = PLYL, pHZHE = PHYH, labor market clearing LE = ALl,


















Equation (38) shows that relative protability has two components: a "price eect", whereby prots
19are higher in those sectors that produce more expensive goods, and a "market size eect", whereby
prots are higher in larger sectors (i.e. in sectors that employ more workers).









Thus, technology is biased towards the employed factor that is relatively more abundant, if the
elasticity of substitution between factors is greater than unity. Substituting (39) into the expression
for the skill premium (27), we get an expression for the skill premium as a function of relative









Hence, the skill premium with endogenous technology is increasing in relative employment of skilled
workers as long as  > 2. This means that relative demand for skilled labor has to be suciently
elastic for the skill premium to increase in relative employment. Finally, combining wages (21) and
hiring costs (23), we obtain expressions for relative employment and employment rates and, using














































Relative employment and relative employment rates are increasing in relative endowments of work-
ers, if 0 <    2 < . The same is true for relative wages. The reason is as follows. First, relative
wages are increasing in relative employment, if the relative labor demand function (40) is increas-
ing (if    2 > 0). This is because, while sectoral prices decrease with sector size, which implies
lower revenues and lower wages, technology improves in sector size and, therefore, revenue and
wages increase (given  1 > 0). Second, relative wages are also increasing in relative employment
according to the matching function (24). Matching frictions imply that rms need to pay greater
wages as the number of employed increases (the more so the greater  is), because labor market
tightness increases. Thus, we can state the following proposition.
20Proposition 2. With endogenous technologies, an increase in the relative number of skilled results
in an increase in their wage and employment rate relative to unskilled, if 0 <    2 < , and in a
decrease otherwise.
Let us examine more closely the labor market eects of an increase in the relative supply of skilled,
H/L. For given wages, the relative employment of skilled increases: the matching function (24) shifts
to the right. The overall eect on relative wages and employment, however, depends on whether
wages increase more strongly with employment according to relative matching (24) or labor demand
(40): whether (24) crosses (40) from below (Figure 7, panel a) or above (Figure 7, panel b). In the
rst case, where    2 <  (relative labor demand is relatively elastic compared to the matching
elasticity23), relative wages and employment of the skilled increase. In the second case, where
   2 >  (relative labor demand is relatively inelastic), relative wages and employment of skilled
decrease because the labor market cannot absorb the additional skilled workers. Note also that the
relative size of the wage and employment response depends on the elasticity of monopolists' labor
demand. More elastic labor demand (smaller ) translates into a smaller eect on the relative wage
and a greater eect on the relative employment of skilled. Relative employment rates, however,
always react more strongly than relative wages to changes in the relative supply of skilled according
to the exponents of (42) and (43).
3.6 Equilibrium with Migration and Endogenous Technology
Having gained intuition for the economic forces at work, we now solve for the equilibrium with
endogenous technology and migration. As described for the case of exogenous technology in section
3.4, general equilibrium emigration rates sH and sL are implicitly dened by the two migration
equations (31) and (32).
In the case of endogenous technology, we substitute for expected wages wHxH and wLxL as func-
tions of sH and sL as follows. According to the matching function (23), wages of the skilled and






















PLLE   L = 0
23The elasticity of labor demand is given by 1
 2 according to (40) and the matching elasticity is given by 1

according to (24).
21where we substituted for pHyH and pLyL by rst using the intermediate production functions
yH = Zh and yL = l and then using the fact that pHh = PHYH
ZAH = PHHE and pLl = PLYL
AL = PLLE.









gously, for PL. We further substitute for the sectoral relative price PH=PL using (26) together with
relative technologies (39) and for relative employment (41).
As a result, we can again re-write wages wH and wL and employment rates xH and xL to express

















































Substituting (44) and (45) into the migration equations (31) and (32), we obtain again two equa-
tions in sH and sL. Even though these equations again cannot be solved analytically, some intuition
can be gained from them. Suppose the skilled migration rate increases above its equilibrium value.
This, on the one hand, reduces expected wages because a decrease in skill endowments leads to an
endogenous adjustment of technology and, thus, demand for skills and further increases incentives
for emigration (term in inner square brackets). On the other hand, an increase in skilled migration
increases expected wages because of the increase in labor market tightness (rst term in outer
square brackets). Overall, this second eect becomes dominating whenever the skilled migration
rate is too far above its equilibrium value. While the rst eect reinforces migration incentives and
suggests multiplicity of equilibria as found in Grossmann and Stadelmann (2011) and De la Croix
and Docquier (2010), the second eect guarantees that the equilibrium is unique, as is conrmed
by our simulations.
4 Simulation of Emigration Rates and Brain Drain
The implicit general equilibrium emigration rates of skilled and unskilled workers in our model are
described by the two equations (31) and (32). Since these equations cannot be solved analytically,
we need to calibrate the model and solve it numerically. In this section we rst discuss the choice of
parameter values and then perform some comparative statics exercises. We rst simulate the eects
of increases in the skill ratio on employment rates, expected wages and migration rates and show
that they crucially depend on the elasticity of substitution, , and on whether technology is taken
as xed or as endogenous. Then, we show that even under a very restrictive parameterization, the
22model with endogenous technology can replicate most of the signs and the approximate magnitudes
of the empirically observable correlations between brain drain, migration rates, unemployment
rates, wages, technologies and skill ratios.
4.1 Calibration
We now describe the choice of parameter values (summarized in Table 7). A key parameter in
our model is the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers, . Gancia, M uller
and Zilibotti (2011) calibrate  using a version of equation (40) without unemployment to t
the evolution of the US skill premium, dened as the relative wage of college graduates over non-
college graduates between 1970 and 2000. They nd a value of  equal to 2.25. Thus, in our baseline
calibration we set =2.25. Note that this value is somewhat larger than the value of the short-run
elasticity between skilled and unskilled labor found by other studies (e.g. Ciccone and Peri (2006)
provide estimates for this parameter in the interval [1.4,2]). We therefore also consider alternative
values for  2 f1:6;1:75;2;2:4g in our simulations.
Another important parameter is , the elasticity of the matching function. While Shimer (2005)
estimates this parameter to be 0.27, Mortensen and Nagypal (2007) provide a point estimate of 0.54
for the same parameter. When addressing problems with both approaches, Br ugeman (2008) nds
 to lie in the interval [0.37, 0.46]. We thus set  = 0:46 for our calibration exercise. To calibrate the
other parameters of the matching functions, aH and aL, we use the matching function (23) together
with the fact that bj = wj and employment weighted averages of OECD wage and employment
data. Solving the equation for aH(aL), gives us values of 0.38 and 0.16 respectively. Note that since
this parameter refers to the eciency of a country's labor market institutions, assuming the same
values for all countries is a very restrictive assumption, which will tie our hands when trying to
replicate the data on migration and unemployment rates with the model.
Similarly, we constrain exogenous dierences in the relative eciency of skilled labor, measured
by Z, by setting this parameter to match the skill premium for the average OECD country using
equation (27). This gives us Z = 2:56.
Consistently with the consensus in the international trade literature, we set the elasticity between
varieties, , equal to 4. This is the mean value of the substitution elasticity estimates from Broda
and Weinstein (2006), who use trade data to estimate this parameter. Similarly, Bernard, Eaton,
Jensen and Kortum (2003) nd an estimate of 3.8, when tting US plant and macro data.
Moreover, we need parameter values for the OECD employment rates and wages. According to
our data, the employment weighted average of OECD employment rates is 0.96 for skilled and
0.95 for unskilled workers. Similarly, average yearly OECD wages in constant PPPs are around
23US$ 37,000 for skilled and US$ 15,000 for unskilled workers. We therefore set wOECD
H = 0:37 and
wOECD
L = 0:15, xOECD
H = 0:96 and xOECD
L = 0:95.
To obtain estimates of the average migration costs of skilled and unskilled workers, we employ two
alternative approaches. In the rst experiment, where we just assess how the model performs for an
average country in our sample given the average skill ratio H=L = 1=10 and the average working
age population of 11 million, we calibrate cH and cL to match average migration rates of skilled
and unskilled workers exactly. For the second experiment, where we compare how well the model
can replicate the correlations in the data, we tie our hands further: We estimate country-specic
migration costs for skilled and unskilled workers using the estimated values from regression (2). In
particular, we employ the specication in column (4), where the vector of control variables consists
of geographic variables and skill ratios instrumented with education expenditure. The estimated
skill-specic migration cost is then ^ cij = ^ 1j log(distance)+^ 2jColony+^ 3jEnglish+^ 4jFrench.
To calibrate the xed costs, we constrain H = L =  and use the model { given estimated
migration costs and the other parameter values { to solve for this parameter by matching skilled
migration rates for a typical OECD country exactly.
4.2 The Impact of the Elasticity of Substitution
According to our model, the eects of changes in the skill ratio on wages, employment rates and
emigration rates crucially depend on the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled
workers. Figure 8 (panel a) shows the expected wage of skilled relative to unskilled workers as a
function of the skill ratio for dierent values of . As predicted by our partial equilibrium model (i.e.
for given sH and sL) in Proposition 2, also in general equilibrium with endogenously determined
migration rates the skill premium and the relative employment rate of the skilled are increasing
in the skill ratio as long as  2 (2;2 + ), i.e. for  2 f2:25;2:4g. Dierently, wage premia and
relative employment rates are constant, if  = 2 and they are decreasing in the skill ratio for
 2 f1:6;1:75g. As expected, the positive relative wage and employment eects are stronger for
 = 2:4 compared to  = 2:25: a greater elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled
leads to a smaller elasticity of relative labor demand; then, any increase in the relative endowment
of skilled leads to a greater increase in the relative wage of skilled. Panels b and c of Figure 8 depict
expected wages separately for the skilled and unskilled and Figure 9 shows how these translate into
changes in the equilibrium emigration rates of skilled and unskilled workers (panels a and b) and,
in consequence, the brain drain (panel c). For  = 2:25 and  = 2:4, the emigration rate of skilled
workers decreases up to a skill ratio of around 0.4 and then starts to increase, while the unskilled
emigration rate is slightly increasing for any skill ratio. Intuition for the negative (positive) relation
between skill ratios and skilled migration rates can be gained from expressions (44) and (45). For
24 2 (2;2 + ), expected skilled wages for given migration rates are, on the one hand, increasing in
the skill ratio because of the upward-sloping labor demand and, on the other hand, decreasing in
the absolute skill endowments because of the matching frictions. For relatively low absolute values
of skill endowments the rst eect dominates, such that expected wages of skilled are increasing
in skill endowments. The increase in expected skilled wages reduces the migration incentives for
skilled workers and thus reduces skilled migration rates in equilibrium. However, at a skill ratio
of around 0.4 the positive rst eect starts to become dominated by the negative second eect
and expected skilled wages start to decline (see Figure 8, panel b). This results in an increase
in skilled migration rates. As the skill ratio is typically below this threshold even in rich OECD
countries, increases in skill endowments should generally lead to reductions in skilled migration
rates. Dierently, since endowments of unskilled workers are held constant, expected wages of
the unskilled are only changing due to the change in the skill ratio. This eect is unambiguously
negative and thus equilibrium unskilled migration rates are increasing in the skill ratio (see Figure
8, panel b). In case of our benchmark  = 2:25, the quantitative eects are most pronounced for
small skill ratios (below 0.2), while they become much less important for greater skill ratios. We
thus expect a larger impact of skill accumulation for relatively skill scarce developing countries.
For values of  equal to 1.6, 1.75 and 2 both the skilled and the unskilled emigration rates increase
in the skill ratio. The skilled migration rate is now increasing because an increase in the skill ratio
now unambiguously reduces expected wages of skilled workers: the positive wage eect resulting
from the increase in demand for the skilled is now smaller and the negative congestion eect from
the matching frictions dominates for all skill ratios H=L 2 (0;1). This increases skilled workers'
incentives to emigrate and thus pushes up skilled migration rates. Unskilled emigration rates are
still increasing in skill endowments, as expected wages of the unskilled are decreasing with the
decrease in employment LE that comes with an increase in the skill ratio.24
4.3 The Impact of Skill-Biased Technological Change
The relation between skill endowments and the brain drain according to our model is very dierent
depending on whether we assume technology to be exogenous or endogenous. In this exercise we
use our preferred calibration for  = 2:25 and again choose migration costs to match observed
migration rates for an average country with a skill ratio of 0.1. Table 7 shows emigration rates
that correspond to progressively increasing levels of the skill ratio with endogenous (panel a) and
exogenous (panel b) technology. In panel b, technology parameter values AH and AL were chosen
such that emigration rates are exactly the same as in the case of endogenous technology for a skill
ratio of 0.1. Consistent with Propositions 1 and 2, an increase in the skill ratio results in a decrease
24Overall, the increase in the skill ratio results in a decrease in the skill premium and an increase in the brain
drain, as the decrease in skilled wages is stronger than the decrease in unskilled wages.
25in skilled migration rates and in brain drain in the case where technology can adjust endogenously
(panel a) but results in an increase of skilled migration rates and the brain drain when technology
is assumed to remain constant (panel b). The intuition is pretty straightforward: with endogenous
technology and  2 (2;2 + ) the relative demand curve for skilled workers is upward sloping such
that an increase in skill endowments leads to a drop in the unemployment rate of skilled workers
and an increase in their expected wages. As a result the skilled migration rate drops. The opposite
is true for unskilled workers: they experience an increase in the unemployment rate, a decline in
expected wages and thus an increased migration rate. In contrast, with exogenous technology the
relative demand curve for skilled workers is downward sloping. Thus, an increase in the skill ratio
increases the unemployment rate of skilled workers, reduces their expected wages and increases their
migration rate. Dierently, with exogenous technology unskilled workers benet from an increase
in the supply of skilled workers. Since unskilled workers become relatively scarcer, they experience
lower unemployment rates and higher expected wages, leading to lower migration rates. We can
also observe that quantitatively the response of emigration rates is much greater when technology
is endogenous than when it is exogenous. For example, a doubling of the skill ratio from 10 to 20
% would result in a decrease of the brain drain by 37% (from 4.20 to 2.64 percentage points) in
the former case and an increase of the brain drain by 9% (from 4.20 to 4.59 percentage points) in
the latter case.
4.4 Predicted and Actual Correlations
For the last both qualitative and quantitative test of our model, we check if we can use it to replicate
a number of (conditional) correlations that we observe in the data. To this end, we proceed as
follows. First, in order to be able to test the model, we calibrate all parameters from outside data
and use estimated migration costs for each country, as explained in the section on parameter choice.
Thus, we do not match any data moments by construction. For the set of countries for which we
have data for 1990 and 2000, we pool both years and regress variables of interest on each other,
controlling for time dummies, to squeeze out the pure cross-sectional variation (compare Figures
1-5). We then compare those conditional correlations with the ones that we obtain from running
the same regressions on our simulated data. We compare the following conditional correlations:
between the relative unemployment rate of skilled workers and the skill ratio, brain drain and
the skill ratio, skilled/unskilled migration rates and the skill ratio, brain drain and the relative
unemployment rate, skill premia and the skill ratio, relative technology AH=AL
25 and the skill
ratio and, nally, the correlation between changes in brain drain and changes in the skill ratio
between 1990 and 2000. Our baseline calibration is again  = 2:25 but we also report results for
25Data on AH=AL are constructed using equation (27).
26 2 f1:9;2:1;2:4g. Moreover, we contrast the correlations under the assumption of endogenous
technology (and  = 2:25) with those simulated under the assumption that all countries have
exogenous technologies with AH and AL equal to the OECD averages constructed using equation
(27).
The results of this exercise are presented in Table 8. In column one we report conditional correla-
tions as observed empirically and in columns (2) to (6) we report conditional correlations computed
from the simulated data under dierent assumptions. Turning rst to our baseline calibration with
 = 2:25 (in column 4), the model replicates the signs and the approximate magnitudes of the
correlations between relative unemployment rates and skill ratios (-0.64, compared to -0.21 in the
data), the one between brain drain and skill ratios (-0.48 compared to -0.83 in the data), the one
between brain drain and relative unemployment rates (0.37 compared to 0.78) and the one be-
tween unskilled migration rates and skill ratios (0.47 compared to 0.53 in the data) quite well. It
matches exactly the correlation between the relative productivity of skill AH=AL and skill ratios
(0.53). It performs less well in terms of the correlation between skilled migration rates and skill
ratios (-0.02 compared to -0.4), where it underpredicts the negative correlation substantially and
in terms of predicting correlations between changes in the brain drain and changes in skill ratios (-
0.15 compared to -1.3), where it also underpredicts changes. Finally, the model gets the correlation
between skill premia and skill ratios (0.55 compared -0.15) wrong, which is negative in the data
and positive in the model. The reason is that the model tightly connects wage premia and skill
ratios via equation (43) assuming there are no dierences in labor market institutions (aH;aL) or
in technology Z across countries. Information on the cross-country variation in those parameters
could help improve this correlation.
We now briey discuss results for dierent values of : For  = 2:1 the signs of the correlations
are (except in one case) the same ones as for  = 2:25 but the magnitudes are often further
away from the empirical correlations. The same is true for  = 2:4. In both cases, the model
gets the correlation between skilled migration rates and skill ratios wrong, which now becomes
slightly positive. The example with  = 1:9 is representative for the case where the elasticity of
substitution is smaller than two and the labor demand curve is downward-sloping. In this case,
the model captures almost none of the features in the data. It now wrongly predicts a positive
correlation between relative unemployment rates and skill ratios, a negative correlation between
brain drain and relative unemployment rates and a positive correlation between skilled emigration
rates and skill ratios. Very similar results hold for the model with exogenous technology.
We thus conclude that a very simple model of migration with endogenously directed technology
and  > 2 performs reasonably well in terms of replicating the correlations between skill-specic
labor market outcomes and migration rates in the data. In contrast, the same model with  < 2
or with exogenous technology { both of which imply a downward-sloping relative demand curve
27for skilled labor { cannot replicate the salient features of the data. We take this as support for the
mechanisms emphasized in our model.
5 Conclusion
We develop a general equilibrium model of directed technological change and migration to examine
the eects of a change in skill endowments on wages, employment rates and emigration rates of
skilled and unskilled workers. We nd that, depending on the elasticity of substitution between
skilled and unskilled workers, returns to skill can be an increasing function of skill ratios in the
presence of skill-biased technological change: an increase in the stock of workers of a given skill can
result in an increase in their expected wage by reducing their unemployment rate. In consequence,
the relative emigration rate of skilled workers (brain drain) can decrease in the skill ratio. We
provide empirical estimates and simulations of wages, employment rates and emigration rates to
conrm that endowment eects are empirically relevant and potentially sizeable. Our ndings
t the stylized facts on educational upgrading in developing countries during the 1980s and the
subsequent decrease in the brain drain during the 1990s. They suggest that education policies can
contribute signicantly to a slow down in brain drain and, therefore, an improvement in long-run
perspectives for prosperity and growth in emigration countries.
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We construct wages for skilled and unskilled workers from the Occupational Wages around the
World (OWW) dataset that has been compiled by Freeman and Oostendorp (2000) from ILO
data. This dataset covers the period 1983-2001 and contains wages by occupation for a large
sample of countries. Wages are reported as the average monthly wage rate of male workers in
constant dollars, which we convert into yearly PPP-adjusted wages using price indices from the
Penn World Tables 6.2. Instead, we need to aggregate occupational wages into series of skilled
and unskilled wages under the constraint that the number of occupations for which wage data are
available dier across countries for a given time period and for a given country across time. We
follow the procedure suggested by Chor (2001) to construct the two wage series, taking a xed
set of seven skilled and seven unskilled occupations.26 For skilled and unskilled occupations we
separately perform the following procedure.27 We regress wages for occupation o in country c in
period t, wcto on the wages of all the other occupations in separate regressions to squeeze out the
common trend for these occupations for a given country: wcto = 1wcto0 +co+uct0, and we obtain
predicted values as ^ 1wcto0 + ^ co. Subsequently, we average the predicted values of all regressions
to obtain an estimate of the wage series. Finally, we take 1983 wage data to construct wages for
the year 1980 and we take averages of the data using one year windows around 1985, 1990, 1995
and 2000 to maximize data availability.
Human capital stocks
Data on educational attainment of the population come from Barro and Lee (2000), supplemented
with data by De la Fuente and Domenech (2002) for OECD countries. These data-sources are the
ones that have been used by Beine, Docquier and Rapoport (2008) to construct migration rates by
26The 7 unskilled occupations selected were: thread and yarn spinners in the textiles industry (#25); sewing
machine operators in the manufacture of wearing apparel excluding footwear (#30); laborers in printing, publish-
ing and allied industries (#51); laborers in the manufacture of industrial chemicals and other chemical products
(#56/#59)13; laborers in the manufacture of machinery except electrical (#70); laborers in electric light and power
(#80); and laborers in construction (#90).14 These choices satised three criteria. First, the job scopes did not
require more than primary education. Second, the industries picked were found in most economies, ensuring wide
geographical coverage. These 7 occupations lie on the low end of the wage spectrum in the OWW: In countries that
listed wages for at least 80 of the 159 occupations during 1983-1998, the 7 occupations were in the lower one-third of
the distribution of reported wages in at least 75% of country-year pairs, with one exception (#80). For skilled labor,
the 7 occupations were: chemical engineers in the manufacture of industrial chemicals (#52); power distribution and
transmission engineers (#76); bank accountants (#129); computer programmers in the insurance industry (#133);
government executive ocials in public administration (#139); mathematics teachers at the third (tertiary) level
(#145); and general physicians (#152). The skilled workers we focus on are professionals. The 'skilled' wage is thus
a wage return to technical expertise that would require at least a secondary level of schooling. Certainly, these
7 occupations lie above the 75th percentile of the wage distribution for country-year pairs reporting at least 80
occupations during 1983-1998.
27For a more detailed explanation see Chor (2001).
33skill. Skilled workers are those with tertiary education (13 years and above), while all other workers
are considered as unskilled for our purposes. This is the standard denition of skilled workers in
the brain drain literature and matches our denition of skilled wages quite closely. These data are
available in 5 year intervals and we use those for 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995 and 2000.
Migration rates
The source of the migration data by skill level is Beine, Docquier and Rapoport's (2008) database
on migration to the OECD countries by sending country and skill level for the years 1990 and
2000. They construct migration rates by sending country by combining information on migrant
stocks in OECD countries by skill with data on educational attainment of the sending countries'
labor force.28 Migrants are dened as all working-age (25 and over) foreign-born individuals living
in an OECD country. Skilled migrants are those who have at least tertiary educational attainment
that has been acquired in their home countries. Migration rates are measured as stock variables.
Denoting Hit (Lit) as the stock of skilled (unskilled) residents and Hmit (Lmit) as the stock of
skilled (unskilled) migrants age 25 or over from country i at time t, emigration rates of the skilled
and unskilled are dened as sHit = Hmit
Hit+Hmit and sLit = Lmit
Lit+Lmit. More precisely, sjit measures
the fraction of agents of skill j 2 fH;Lg born in country i and living in an OECD country at time
t. Brain drain is the relative migration rate of skilled workers, dened as brain drainit = sHit=sLit.
Unemployment rates
Unemployment rates for skilled and unskilled workers have been constructed from the ILO Key
Indicators of the Labour Market database. This database provides information on employment
by educational attainment for a (strongly unbalanced) panel of countries. We have combined this
information with the data on the number of workers by educational attainment from Barro and
Lee (2000) and De la Fuente and Domenech (2002) to construct unemployment rates for skilled
and unskilled workers for 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995 and 2000.
Other data
We use additional control variables such as real PPP-GDP growth and openness, dened as (ex-
ports+imports)/GDP, from the Penn World Tables 6.2. We also use educational spending as a
fraction of GDP from the Word Development Indicators 2000 and a number of country-specic
variables, such as distance from the OECD, an indicator of whether a country has been a colony
of an OECD country after 1945, and an indicator of whether a country has English or French as
an ocial language.
28Since most migration is to OECD countries, this is a good proxy for total migration rates.
34Tables and Figures
Figure 1: Skill ratio and relative unemployment
Figure 2: Skill ratio and brain drain
35Figure 3: Relative unemployment and brain drain
Figure 4: Educational upgrading in OECD and non-OECD countries during 1990 and 2000
36Figure 5: Change in skill ratio and change in brain drain during 1990 and 2000
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































41Table 2: Skill ratio and brain drain
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Brain Drain  Brain Drain
Skill ratio -0.833*** -0.830*** -0.635*** -0.973***









GDP per capita -0.0107
(0.121)
GDP Growth rate -0.266 -0.26 -0.368
(0.203) (0.212) (0.373)
Openness -0.217 -0.242** -0.0556
(0.13) (0.108) (0.198)
Skill ratiot 1 -0.235* -0.363*
(0.129) (0.187)
 Skill ratio -0.457**
(0.179)
 Growth rate -0.322** -0.106
(0.156) (0.183)
 Openness 0.106 -1.866*
(0.132) (0.966)
Time Fixed Eects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Estimator OLS OLS OLS IV OLS OLS IV
Instrument Edu.Exp.t 1 Edu.Exp.t 1
Cluster Country Country Country Country Country Country Country
Observations 232 170 170 66 93 71 54
Countries 121 87 87 66 93 71 54
R-squared 0.669 0.709 0.773 0.037 0.147
Dependent variable is the (change of) (log) skilled relative to unskilled migration rates from the source
country to the OECD. Explanatory variables include levels or changes of log skill ratios, migration
cost proxies (distance to the OECD, dummies for colony of the OECD, English and French as ocial
languages), the level of GDP per capita, the growth rate of GDP, openness. Data are for 1990 and 2000.
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































43Table 4: Skill ratio and skill-specic technologies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AH=AL  AH=AL
Skill ratio 0.415*** 0.415*** 0.595*** 0.427***
(0.071) (0.073) (0.118) (0.0727)
GDP per capita -0.289**
(0.143)
GDP Growth rate -0.063 0.152 -0.0691
(0.539) (0.529) (0.521)
Openness 0.0498 0.186 0.0674
(0.149) (0.173) (0.144)
 Skill ratio 0.755*** 0.735
(0.174) -0.486
 Growth rate -0.25 -0.254
(0.295) -0.296
 Openness 0.173 0.169
(0.199) -0.184
Time Fixed Eects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Estimator OLS OLS OLS IV OLS IV
Instrument Edu.Exp.t 1 Skillt 1
Cluster Country Country Country Country Country Country
Observations 133 132 132 130 67 67
Countries 62 61 61 60 40 40
R-squared 0.44 0.441 0.48 0.478 0.3
Dependent variable is the (change of) (log) relative productivity of skilled relative to unskilled workers
constructed from equation (7). Explanatory variables include levels or changes of log skill ratios, the level
of GDP per capita, the growth rate of GDP, openness. The dataset is an unbalanced panel in ve-year
intervals from 1980-2000. All standard errors are clustered at the country level.
Table 5: Skill-specic unemployment and brain drain
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Brain Drain B.D.
Relative Unemployment 0.506*** 0.457*** 0.340* 0.151 0.725**









GDP per capita 0
(0.000)
GDP Growth rate -0.196 0.171 -0.538 0.283
(0.62) (0.586) (0.463) (0.879)
Openness -0.168 -0.135 -0.0991 0.105
(0.198) (0.208) (0.134) (0.210)
 Relative Unemployment 0.0849*
(0.047)
Time Fixed Eects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS IV OLS
Instrument Edu.Exp.t 1
Cluster Country Country Country Country Country Country
Observations 72 63 63 63 52 13
Countries 59 50 50 50 40 13
R-squared 0.277 0.24 0.291 0.554 0.133
Dependent variable is the (change of) (log) skilled relative to unskilled migration rates from the source
country to the OECD. Explanatory variables include levels or changes of log relative unemployment rates
of skilled workers, migration cost proxies (distance to the OECD, dummies for colony of the OECD, English
and French as ocial languages), the level of GDP per capita, the growth rate of GDP, openness. Data
are for 1990 and 2000. All standard errors are clustered at the country level.





H aH aL H L
Value 0.37 0.15 0.96 0.95 0.38 0.16 3.8 3.8
Parameter Z L   cH cL 
Value 2.56 10 0.46 4 1.49 2.38 2.25
The baseline parameters are taken from the literature as described in section 4.1.
Migration costs are chosen to match observed migration rates.
Table 7: Simulation of emigration rates depending on the skill ratio
H/L 0.01 0.05 0.10 0.20 0.50 1
Panel a: Endogenous technology
sH 0.24 0.23 0.21 0.15 0.11 0.16
sL 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.09
sH=sL 4.90 4.70 4.20 2.64 1.35 1.75
Panel b: Exogenous technology
sH 0.17 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.22
sL 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03
sH=sL 3.22 3.88 4.20 4.59 5.42 6.54
In Panel b, AH=0.3 and AL=0.1 were chosen such that for H/L=0.1 emigration rates
are exactly the same as in the case of endogenous technology.
Table 8: Predicted and actual correlations
Endogenous Tech. Exog. Tech.
Data  =1.9  =2.1 =2.25  =2.4  =2.25
corr(log(uH=uL);log(H=L)) -0.210*** 0.275*** -0.336*** -0.636*** -0.469 -0.001
corr(log(sH=sL);log(H=L)) -0.826*** -0.030 -0.428*** -0.479*** -0.378*** 0.852***
corr(log(wH=wL);uH=uL) 0.778*** -0.118*** 0.095 0.374*** 0.506*** 0.001***
corr(log(wH=wL);H=L) -0.152*** -0.082*** 0.128*** 0.551*** 3.080 -0.0002
corr(log(sH=(1   sH);H=L) -0.396*** 0.474*** 0.041 -0.018 0.065*** 1.175***
corr(log(sL=(1   sL);H=L) 0.530*** 0.501 0.477*** 0.466*** 0.447*** 0.323***
corr(log(sH=sL);H=L) -1.303*** -0.270*** -0.248 -0.151 -0.030 1.065***
corr(AH=AL;H=L),  = 1:9 0.796*** -0.093***
corr(AH=AL;H=L)  = 2:1 0.622*** 0.121***
corr(AH=AL;H=L)  = 2:25 0.528*** 0.528***
corr(AH=AL;H=L)  = 2:4 0.454*** 3.060***
Partial correlations between relative unemployment rates, (changes of) brain drain, relative wage of skilled
workers, skilled migration rate, unskilled migration rate and (changes of) skill ratios. Time-specic eects
are controlled for. The rst column presents the empirical correlations. Columns (2)-(6) present correlations
generated by the model using dierent values for the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled
workers (). Column (2) is our baseline calibration and column (6) presents results for the case of exogenous
technology. *** denotes signicance at the one percent level.
45